Anthimos Gogos, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMS Mechanical Systems, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. by Cudahy, Judge Richard Dickson et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
ADAAA Case Repository Labor and Employment Law Program 
12-9-2013 
Anthimos Gogos, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMS Mechanical Systems, 
Inc., Defendant-Appellee. 
Judge Richard Dickson Cudahy 
Judge Ilana Rovner 
Judge Ann Claire Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/adaaa 
Thank you for downloading this resource, provided by the ILR School's Labor and Employment 
Law Program. Please help support our student research fellowship program with a gift to the 
Legal Repositories! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Labor and Employment Law Program at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in ADAAA Case Repository by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Anthimos Gogos, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMS Mechanical Systems, Inc., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Keywords 
Anthimos Gogos, AMS Mechanical Systems Inc., 13-2571, Decision on Appeal, Disparate Treatment, 
Termination, Other physical impairment disability, Major Bodily Function Operations, Seeing, Utilities, 
Employment Law, ADAAA 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/adaaa/224 
Case: 13-2571 Document: 14 Filed: 12/16/2013 Pages: 7
In t he
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 13-2571
An th im o s  Go g o s,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMS m ec h a n ic a l  Sy stem s, In c .,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 13 C 3779 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge.
Su bm itt ed  De c e m b e r  9, 2013* — Dec id ed  De c e m b e r  16, 2013
Before CUDAHY, ROVNER, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Anthimos Gogos is suing his former 
employer, AMS Mechanical Systems, Inc., alleging that it 
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112,
The appellee was not served with process in the district court and is not 
participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant's brief and the 
record, we have concluded that oral argument is not necessary. Thus, the 
appeal is submitted on the appellant's brief and the record. See Fed. R. App. 
P. 34(a)(2)(C).
AUTHENTICATED 
U.S. GOVERNMENT 
INFORMATION ^
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by firing him because of his disability, vision and circulatory 
problems caused by high blood pressure. The district court 
dismissed the action, but because Gogos states a claim for relief 
under the ADA, we vacate the dismissal and remand for 
further proceedings.
Gogos based his complaint on the following allegations, 
which we regard as true for purposes of this appeal. See Hemi 
Grp., LLC v. City o f New York, 559 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Swanson v. 
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 2010). Gogos, a pipe 
welder with forty-five years experience, has taken medication 
to reduce his elevated blood pressure for more than eight 
years. He began working for AMS in December 2012 as a 
welder and pipe-fitter. The next month, his blood pressure 
spiked to "very high," and he experienced intermittent vision 
loss (sometimes for a few minutes at a time). Shortly after 
reporting to work on January 30, 2013, Gogos discovered that 
his right eye was red, and he requested and received from his 
supervisor leave to seek immediate medical treatment for his 
blood pressure and ocular conditions. As Gogos left the work 
site, he saw his general foreman and told him that he was 
going to the hospital because "my health is not very good 
lately." The foreman immediately fired him.
After Gogos pursued an administrative charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he sued in 
federal court. He attached to his employment-discrimination 
complaint (prepared on a form supplied by the clerk's office) 
a one-page narrative of his allegations and copies of his 
administrative charge and right-to-sue letter. He applied to 
proceed in forma pauperis and requested that the court recruit 
counsel, explaining that he cannot afford an attorney, that he
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has only a grammar-school education, and that English is not 
his primary language.
The district court dismissed the action. It reasoned that 
Gogos's medical conditions were "transitory" and "suspect" 
and therefore did not qualify as disabilities under the ADA. 
Concluding that it therefore lacked "subject matter 
jurisdiction," the court dismissed the action and denied as 
moot Gogos's in forma pauperis application and motion to 
recruit counsel. The court also later denied Gogos's motion to 
reconsider the dismissal because Gogos failed to show in his 
motion that he pursued his administrative remedies before 
filing suit.
On appeal Gogos argues generally that the district court 
erred in dismissing this action. As an initial matter we note 
that, because Gogos attached to his complaint the charge of 
discrimination that he filed with the Commission and his right- 
to-sue letter, the complaint does not reflect a failure to pursue 
administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117, 2000e-5(e)(1); 
Basith v. Cook Cnty., 241 F.3d 919, 931 (7th Cir. 2001).
We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a claim. 
See Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 669-70 (7th 
Cir. 2012); Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 
440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009). A frivolous allegation of a violation of 
federal law will not engage the subject-matter jurisdiction of a 
federal court. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974). 
But Gogos properly invoked federal jurisdiction by alleging 
that his former employer violated the ADA when it fired him 
because of his blood-pressure problems. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 
Bovee v. Broom, 732 F.3d 743, 744 (7th Cir. 2013). Accordingly,
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the dismissal for lack of "subject matter jurisdiction" was 
incorrect.
We assume that the district court mischaracterized its 
dismissal as jurisdiction-based and intended to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim. See Bovee, 732 F.3d at 744. 
Accordingly, we evaluate de novo whether Gogos's pro se 
complaint fails to state a claim for relief, "making all possible 
inferences from the allegations in [his] favor." AnchorBank, FSB 
v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive dismissal, 
a complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief under Title I of the 
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), requires Gogos to allege facts 
showing that "(1) he is 'disabled'; (2) he is qualified to perform 
the essential function of the job either with or without 
reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse 
employment action because of his disability." E.E.O.C. v. Lee's 
Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 2008); Dargis v. 
Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 2008). Since Gogos was 
discharged after January 1, 2009, the 2008 amendments to the 
ADA, which expanded the Act's coverage, apply to his claim. 
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553.
Gogos alleged sufficient facts plausibly showing that he is 
disabled. The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities ...; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1). Under the 2008 amendments, a person with an
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impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or a 
record of one, is disabled, even if the impairment is "transitory 
and minor" (defined as lasting six months or less). See id. 
§ 12102(3)(B) (Only paragraph (1)(C) of the definition of 
disability "shall not apply to impairments that are transitory 
and minor."); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). Likewise,"[a]n 
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it 
would substantially limit a major life activity when active." 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).
Based on these provisions, Gogos's episode of a blood- 
pressure spike and vision loss are covered disabilities. He 
attributes both problems to his longstanding blood-pressure 
condition, and the ADA's implementing regulation lists 
hypertension as an example of an "impairment[] that may be 
episodic." Under the 2008 amendments, "[t]he fact that the 
periods during which an episodic impairment is active and 
substantially limits a major life activity may be brief or occur 
infrequently is no longer relevant to determining whether the 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity." 29 C.F.R. 
Pt. 1630, App. at Section 1630.2(j)(1)(vii). Instead, the relevant 
issue is whether, despite their short duration in this case, 
Gogos's higher-than-usual blood pressure and vision loss 
substantially impaired a major life activity when they occurred. 
See id. Construing the complaint generously and drawing 
reasonable inferences in Gogos's favor, we conclude that they 
did. Gogos alleges that his episode of "very high" blood 
pressure and intermittent blindness substantially impaired two 
major life activities: his circulatory function and eyesight. 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(2). Accordingly, he has alleged a covered 
disability.
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Moreover, Gogos's alleged chronic blood-pressure 
condition—for which he has taken medication for more than 
eight years—could also qualify as a disability. The amended 
ADA provides that when "determ ining] whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity[,] the 
am eliorative effects of m itigating m easures such 
as ... medication" are not relevant. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I). 
The interpreting regulation explains the new law by way of an 
example directly on point here: "[S]omeone who began taking 
medication for hypertension before experiencing substantial 
limitations related to the impairment would still be an 
individual with a disability if, without the medication, he or 
she would now be substantially limited in functions of the 
cardiovascular or circulatory system." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 
at Section 1630.2(j)(1)(vi). Thus, even if Gogos had not 
experienced the episode of elevated blood pressure and vision 
loss, he could qualify as disabled due to his chronic blood- 
pressure condition.
Gogos alleges facts sufficient to satisfy the remaining 
elements necessary to state a claim for relief under Title I of the 
ADA. He alleges that he had forty-five years of experience as 
a pipe welder and that he worked for AMS as a welder and 
pipe fitter for more than a month before he was fired; thus, he 
adequately pleads that he was qualified to perform the 
essential functions of his job. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Peters v. 
City o f Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2002). And he 
alleges that he suffered an adverse employment action because 
of his disability: he asserts that immediately after he reported 
his medical conditions to his foreman at AMS, the foreman 
fired him. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(a)(1)(ii).
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We VACATE the dismissal and REMAND for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand the 
district court should consider Gogos's application to proceed 
in forma pauperis and, in light of his limited education and 
English fluency, his request for counsel.
